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Transfer of Ownership in Orbit: from Fiction to Problem
Frans von der Dunk*
Abstract
For many years, the concept of transfer of ownership of a satellite in orbit
was not something on the radar screen of anyone seriously involved in
space law, if indeed it was not considered a concept of an essentially fic-
tional nature. Space law after all developed, as far as the key UN treaties
were concerned, in a period when only States – and only very few States
at that – were interested in and possessed the capability of conducting
space activities, and they did so for largely military/strategic or scientific
purposes. The idea of transferring ownership over satellites or other space-
craft involved in such endeavours simply did not make sense.
Leapfrogging the years, however, such transfer of ownership is no lon-
ger fiction, but rather an increasingly frequent fact of life on orbit. This in
turn raises the question of what legal or other issues such events, not ha-
ving been taken into consideration at all in the formative period of the ma-
jor space treaties, would raise. This is essentially what the current contri-
bution undertakes to investigate in a more or less comprehensive, albeit
summary fashion.
From Fiction to Fact
With the gradual commercialization, then privatization of the satellite
communications sector, roughly from the 1980s onwards, the idea of satel-
lites as a commercial commodity, hence of ownership of such a satellite as
being of commercial value and thereby possibly subject to commercial
transactions, started to take hold.
Not accidentally therefore, the first event where this clearly came to the
fore happened in the same timeframe. A Palapa-B2 satellite, launched on 3
1.
* University of Nebraska – Lincoln.
29
A chapter in Ownership of Satellites: 4th Luxembourg Workshop on Space and Satellite Communication Law, Mahulena 
Hofmann and Andreas Loukakis (editors), Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft and Hart Publishing, 
2017, pp. 29–43. Copyright © 2017 Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. Used by permission.
February 1984 from the United States by the Space Shuttle, was inserted
into the wrong orbit, but because of its value to the insurers – the famous
Lloyds – it was valuable enough to be retrieved and brought back to Earth
by another Space Shuttle mission in November of the same year, to be re-
launched on 13 April 1990 on a Delta rocket for an in-orbit handover to
Permutal, the Indonesian government company henceforth running it.1
Since then, actual transfers of ownership of satellites while already in
orbit started to occur with some frequency – often involving multiple
countries. In 1992, BSkyB sold its Marcopolo-2 satellite, launched in
1990, to Norwegian Telecom, who renamed the satellite Thor.2 In 1993
Telesat Canada sold its Anik C1 and C2 satellites, both launched many
years before, to Paracom, an Argentinian company which renamed them
Nahuel I1 and I2 respectively.3 In 1996, BSkyB also sold its Marcopolo-1
satellite, in orbit since 1989, to the Swedish Nordic Satellite AB, which
renamed it Sirius-1 – and in 2000 moved it from its position in geostatio-
nary orbit at 5.2° E to a position at 13° W, where it better served its new
owner’s business purposes.4 More recently, the Korean entity KT Corpora-
tion entered the game, selling in 2009 and 2010 respectively its Koreasat-2
and Koreasat-1B, both launched into orbit by different launch service pro-
viders several years earlier, to the Bermuda-based company ABS with ma-
jor Hong Kong shareholding which renamed them ABS-1A respectively
ABS-7.5 KT Corporation nevertheless remained involved by providing
TT&C support for the satellites, of which the first was moved from the
geostationary slot at 113° E to that at 74.8° E. Most recently, in December
2014, Airbus Defence & Space of France sold a Spot-7 remote sensing sa-
tellite, launched on 30 June 2014, to Azercosmos, the space agency of
Azerbaijan, which immediately renamed it Azersky.6
1 See e.g. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palapa; http://www.sattel.com/life_of_palapa
_b2.htm; http://www.americaspace.com/?p=27134.
2 See e.g. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thor_(satellite); http://space.skyrocket.de/doc
_sdat/marco-polo.htm.
3 See e.g. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anik_(satellite); http://space.skyrocket.de/doc
_sdat/anik-a.htm.
4 See e.g. https://www.satellites.co.uk/forums/threads/bsb-marco-polo-1-2-31w.7380
6/; http://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/marco-polo.htm.
5 See e.g. http://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/koreasat-1.htm; http://space.skyrocket.d
e/doc_sdat/koreasat-3.htm.
6 See e.g. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SPOT_(satellite); http://space.skyrocket.de/do
c_sdat/spot-6.htm.
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Though not strictly speaking amounting to transfer of ownership over a
satellite while it is in orbit, several other events come close enough in
terms of practical and legal consequences to be mentioned here as well.
AsiaSat-1 and AsiaSat-2, owned by AsiaSat of Hong Kong, had been
launched when Hong Kong was still part of the United Kingdom – but
then, in 1997, Hong Kong reverted to China.7 In other words, this was not
so much a case of transfer of ownership of a satellite in orbit, but a case of
transfer of nationality of the owner of a satellite in orbit from one country
to another.
Likewise, Telesat Canada, founded in 1989 as a Canadian company
headquartered in Ottawa, with (presently) ownership over thirteen satelli-
tes and operational responsibility over thirteen more on behalf of other
owners, in 2007 was bought for 64% by Loral, a US company.8 In other
words, not a case of transfer of ownership of a satellite in orbit, but a case
of transfer of ownership of an owner of satellites in orbit. Similar instan-
ces concerned LMI, having launched a LMI-1 satellite in 1996 before
being acquired itself in 2006 by ABS,9 and Mabuhay Satellite Corporati-
on, having an Agila-2 satellite operational since 1997 before then being
acquired itself in 2009 by ABS, which renamed the satellite ABS-5.10
So indeed, the question has now become valid: does this raise legal pro-
blems or issues worthy of discussion, or does existing applicable space
law now raise problems in practice for operators and/or governments con-
cerned?
Transfer of Ownership in Orbit in Existing Space Law
The concept of ‘transfer of ownership’ is completely absent from the ma-
jor space treaties referred to earlier. The Outer Space Treaty11 only refers
to ‘ownership’ once, but interestingly in a manner neither seemingly to al-
2.
7 See e.g. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AsiaSat; http://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/
asiasat-1.htm; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AsiaSat_2.
8 See e.g. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Telesat.
9 See e.g. http://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/lmi-1.htm.
10 See e.g. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mabuhay_Satellite_Corporation; http://spac
e.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/agila-2.htm.
11 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (hereafter Outer
Space Treaty), London/Moscow/Washington, done 27 January 1967, entered into
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low for anything like transfer thereof, nor resulting in any change with re-
gard to the law existing prior to the Treaty’s establishment: “Ownership of
objects launched into outer space, including objects landed or constructed
on a celestial body, and of their component parts, is not affected by their
presence in outer space or on a celestial body or by their return to the
Earth.”12
While the concept of ‘ownership’ is completely absent from the Rescue
Agreement13, the Liability Convention14 and the Registration Conventi-
on15, the Moon Agreement merely echoes the above stipulation of the Ou-
ter Space Treaty: “The ownership of space vehicles, equipment, facilities,
stations and installations shall not be affected by their presence on the
Moon”.16
Also the ITU Constitution17, ITU Convention18 and ITU Radio Regula-
tions19, the main triad of ITU treaty documents providing another set of
force 10 October 1967; 610 UNTS 205; TIAS 6347; 18 UST 2410; UKTS 1968
No. 10; Cmnd. 3198; ATS 1967 No. 24; 6 ILM 386 (1967).
12 Art. VIII, Outer Space Treaty (supra, n. 11).
13 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return
of Objects Launched into Outer Space (hereafter Rescue Agreement), London/
Moscow/Washington, done 22 April 1968, entered into force 3 December 1968;
672 UNTS 119; TIAS 6599; 19 UST 7570; UKTS 1969 No. 56; Cmnd. 3786; ATS
1986 No. 8; 7 ILM 151 (1968).
14 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects
(hereafter Liability Convention), London/Moscow/Washington, done 29 March
1972, entered into force 1 September 1972; 961 UNTS 187; TIAS 7762; 24 UST
2389; UKTS 1974 No. 16; Cmnd. 5068; ATS 1975 No. 5; 10 ILM 965 (1971).
15 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (hereafter Re-
gistration Convention), New York, done 14 January 1975, entered into force 15
September 1976; 1023 UNTS 15; TIAS 8480; 28 UST 695; UKTS 1978 No. 70;
Cmnd. 6256; ATS 1986 No. 5; 14 ILM 43 (1975).
16 Art. 12(1), Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies (hereafter Moon Agreement), New York, done 18 December
1979, entered into force 11 July 1984; 1363 UNTS 3; ATS 1986 No. 14; 18 ILM
1434 (1979).
17 Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union (hereafter ITU Consti-
tution), Geneva, done 22 December 1992, entered into force 1 July 1994; 1825
UNTS 1; UKTS 1996 No. 24; Cm. 2539; ATS 1994 No. 28; Final Acts of the Ad-
ditional Plenipotentiary Conference, Geneva, 1992 (1993), at 1.
18 Convention of the International Telecommunication Union (hereafter ITU Con-
vention), Geneva, done 22 December 1992, entered into force 1 July 1994; 1825
UNTS 1; UKTS 1996 No. 24; Cm. 2539; ATS 1994 No. 28; Final Acts of the Ad-
ditional Plenipotentiary Conference, Geneva, 1992 (1993), at 71.
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legal instruments indispensable for space activities in view of the need for
interference-free usage of certain radio frequencies, do not contain a single
reference to the concept of ‘ownership’, let alone of ‘transfer of owner-
ship’.
This is perhaps not surprising, as the legal concept of ‘ownership’ is es-
sentially a private law notion, and all the above key treaties are fundamen-
tally of a public international law-character. For the same reasons, the only
international treaty relevant to space and fundamentally addressing ow-
nership issues is not only a very recent one, but one addressing private
international law issues at that: the UNIDROIT Space Assets Protocol of
2012.20 In its efforts to establish an international register of securities in
space assets and an internationally harmonized regime for dealing with de-
fault remedies and procedures in order to ease the financing of certain
commercial space operations, the ownership (or other closely-related con-
cepts such as lease) of (amongst others) satellites is at least addressed
three times.21 However, the Space Assets Protocol is not in force, and neit-
her does it look like it will soon enter into force – so effectively the con-
cept of ‘ownership’ does not really exist in, at least, the main space trea-
ties relevant for satellite communications.
‘So what’s the Problem?’
Thus, the next question may be raised: what is the problem with any chan-
ges of ownership (whether of satellites in orbit or otherwise) being basi-
cally ignored by space law and taking place, legally speaking, completely
outside of what those treaties undertook to address and regulate? The key
to the answer seems to lie in the practical fact of life that ‘ownership’
usually also means ‘control’, and certainly with items of such a special
character as high-value satellites, operated by expensive and dedicated
ground stations, this would apply more or less across the board. Such con-
3.
19 Radio Regulations Articles, Edition of 2012 (hereafter Radio Regulations), www.it
u.int/pub/R-REG-RR-2012.
20 Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on
Matters Specific to Space Assets (hereafter Space Assets Protocol), Berlin, done 9
March 2012, not yet entered into force; UNIDROIT Doc., DCME-SP–Doc. 43.
21 Cf. Arts. I(2.h), III, XX(4), Space Assets Protocol (supra n. 20).
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trol furthermore does raise two distinct and very fundamental issues under
current space law.
On the one hand, such ‘control’ over a satellite also effectively means
control over the activities it undertakes. This directly raises the potential
for international responsibility of a State to arise, as every State is re-
sponsible “for national activities in outer space, including the Moon and
other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by govern-
mental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for assuring that na-
tional activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth
in the present Treaty. The activities of non-governmental entities in outer
space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall require autho-
rization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the
Treaty”.22
This, in short, has major legal consequences also for commercial satelli-
te communications, the sector where the concept of ‘transfer of ow-
nership’ is most present and relevant. Most prominently, States are thereby
held responsible for private space activities as if they were their own. Sta-
tes carrying such responsibility would be required to exercise in turn some
form of legal control, in line with the obligations of ‘authorization and
continuing supervision’, over whatever private ‘activities in outer space’
they consider, in the absence of uniformly agreed interpretations of this
concept at the international level23, ‘national’, normally by way of a licen-
sing system24. If then the satellite, subject to such licensing or (in any
event) falling under the relevant State’s responsibility, changes hands, is-
sues of continuing applicability of the license and, in case of an internatio-
22 Art. VI, Outer Space Treaty (supra n. 11).
23 Generally, whereas individual States have their own specific interpretation or mo-
de of implementation, amongst experts three generic interpretations can be discer-
ned: (1) ‘national’ activities are those ‘of nationals’ (whether natural or legal per-
sons), (2) ‘national’ activities are those for which the State qualifies as
the ‘launching State’ (as that concept triggers liability for damage – see further
infra), and (3) ‘national’ activities are those over which a State can exercise juris-
diction either on a personal or on a territorial basis. See e.g. F.G. von der Dunk,
International Space Law, in Handbook of Space Law (Ed. F.G. von der Dunk)
(2015), 53-4.
24 So far, more than a dozen states have actually established national space legislati-
on prominently including such a licensing system for private operators; see further
e.g. I. Marboe, National Space Law, in Handbook of Space Law (Ed. F.G. von der
Dunk)(2015), 130-204.
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nal change of hands even the national licensing regime as such, become an
issue. Thus the purely private-law character of transfer of ownership, by
virtue of the equation of private to governmental space activities for the
purpose of international responsibility, becomes a matter of public law and
policy under the Outer Space Treaty.
Following up on that, although the aforementioned clause strictly
speaking refers to compliance with the Outer Space Treaty itself only, due
to the latter’s fundamental character in defining the legal framework for
all space activities and its blanket application of general international law
thereto by virtue of Article III25, such State responsibility effectively re-
fers to compliance with international law as applicable in outer space com-
prehensively. In that sense, the control of the activity as normally follow-
ing from ownership of the satellite used for that activity pertains to ensu-
ring its conformity with other rules of the space treaties (such as the obli-
gation to have a satellite properly registered, both nationally and interna-
tionally26) but also for example with the ITU regime on allocation, allot-
ment and assignment of orbital frequencies and slots.27
On the other hand, of course, ‘control’ over a space object legally
speaking carries with it the potential for international liability of a State to
arise as a consequence of actions of such a ‘controller’: under the Liability
Convention, States are internationally liable for space objects in respect of
which they qualify as the or a launching State – regardless of whether that
space object is owned, controlled, or operated by a private operator.28
This again means that States are, if not formally required, at least stron-
gly incentivised to exercise legal control over such space objects, as they
would – in first instance at least – have to foot the bill in case it causes
damage in an international setting. Indeed, most States having established
some form of licensing system, as indicated before, have also taken care to
include in that context requirements related to liability, reimbursement of
25 Art. III, Outer Space Treaty (supra n. 11), provides: “States Parties to the Treaty
shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the
Moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, including
the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international
peace and security and promoting international cooperation and understanding.”.
26 See Arts. II-IV, Registration Convention (supra n. 15).
27 See e.g. Arts. 1(2)(a), 44, ITU Constitution (supra n. 17); Arts. 4, 5, Radio Regu-
lations (supra n. 19).
28 See Arts. I(c), II-V, Liability Convention (supra n. 14).
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the government in case of international claims and appropriate third-party
liability insurance.29
In view of the nature of State liability – ‘once a launching State, always
liable’ – a transfer of ownership in orbit may, again, raise questions of ap-
plicability of the license handling such liabilities, or more fundamentally
in case of an international transfer, of jurisdiction of the still-liable State
over the operations of a foreign entity which may result in damage that the
State would have to cover under the Liability Convention.
This is further aggravated by the system of registration, where based
upon the same launching State criterion a State may in theory exercise
quasi-territorial jurisdiction over the satellite, but in case of an internatio-
nal transfer of ownership may actually see such a possibility slip out of
sight, whilst the ‘new’ State of nationality of the new owner may not have
such opportunities to obtain jurisdiction by way of registration if it was
not at least an original launching State of that space object itself.30
In summary, to the extent that private ownership of a satellite indeed
translates into private control thereof and of the activities it is undertaking
in outer space, potential interaction with the sphere of jurisdiction and
control of a State arises – and if the ownership then changes, this system is
completely disrupted.
Back to Practice: Confusion Rules
The result, also in practice, is a considerable amount of confusion regar-
ding the extent of international responsibility and/or liability of the various
States implicated in ownership of satellites and the transfer thereof, and
the extent of such obligations as authorization, continuing supervision and
registration of satellites. The exemplary set of transfers of ownership listed
before shows ample proof of such confusion, resulting in potentially harm-
ful gaps and overlaps of individual States’ actions.
The Palapa-B2 satellite retrieved in 1984 (which had not yet been regis-
tered with the United Nations at the time, in the half year until its retrie-
val), after its re-launch in April 1990 from US territory on a Delta launch
vehicle operated by the US company McDonnell Douglas, was registered
4.
29 See further e.g. Marboe (supra, n. 24), 138 & ff.
30 Cf. e.g. Art. VIII, Outer Space Treaty (supra n. 11), in combination with Art. II,
Registration Convention (supra n. 15).
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by the United States with the United Nations on 17 January 1992.31 This
was logical as the United States was clearly the (or at least a) launching
State of the satellite, and thus automatically entitled to register. However,
it was then handed over in orbit to Permutal, an Indonesian government
company, whereas the United States in contrast remained liable under the
Liability Convention for any international liability that the satellite could
cause without a possibility of direct recourse to Permutal, as the latter was
not licensed by the former.32 Since the launch was actually at least indi-
rectly procured by Permutal (“the Palapa B2R spacecraft (…) is the re-
sponsibility of SATTEL, a United States company, during initial on-orbit
checkout, after which time the satellite will be turned over to PERMU-
TAL, an Indonesian government corporation”33) Indonesia might arguably
have qualified as the other launching state and, by that token, would have
been able to exercise jurisdiction as a State of registration – but did not.
Next was the case of the Marcopolo-2. Its original owner BSkyB is a
UK company which had procured the launch on 17 August 1990 from US
territory on a Delta launcher from the US company McDonnell Douglas.
As the UK Outer Space Act also requires a license from a UK company
for procuring a satellite’s launch,34 the United Kingdom clearly perceived
itself to be a launching State, and hence registered the satellite with the
United Nations on 8 July 1991.35 So far, so good. However, no doubt part-
ly due to the lack of a Norwegian register in the first place36, when the sa-
tellite – long after its 1992 transfer-in-orbit to Norwegian Telecom – was
moved to a graveyard orbit, it was again the United Kingdom, as one of
31 See ST/SG/SER.E/250.
32 While it may be presumed that the launch contract would take care of such liabili-
ties, as insisted upon by the United States when licensing the re-launch in the first
place, the contracts containing such clauses usually remain commercially confi-
dential (making it difficult to judge on their efficacy and appropriateness) and in
any event complicate the ultimate handling of international liability claims which
the United States would have to honour in principle.
33 ST/SG/SER.E/250, at 8.
34 See Secs. 1(a), 2(1), Outer Space Act (hereafter UK Outer Space Act), 18 July
1986, 1986 Chapter 38; National Space Legislation of the World, Vol. I (2001), at
293; Space Law – Basic Legal Documents, E.I; 36 Zeitschrift für Luft- und Welt-
raumrecht (1987), 12.
35 See ST/SG/SER/E/241.
36 Norway notified the United Nations of the establishment of a national register only
as of 21 January 2014; see ST/SG/SER.E/INF/29.
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the original launching States and the State of registry of duty, who (on 15
June 2007) informed the United Nations of such a manoeuvre.37
One year upon the heels of Marcopolo-2’s sale-in-orbit followed that of
the two Anik satellites. Both had been launched on the US Space Shuttle
from the United States, on 12 April 1985 and 18 June 1983, respectively.
Though Telesat Canada, the procurer of the launch, was not a Canadian
government company but a private Canadian one (making it at least de-
batable whether Canada on that count should qualify as a ‘launching Sta-
te’), and though Canada did not have a full-fledged licensing system for
private space operations in place, both satellites were registered with the
United Nations by Canada on 6 February 1987.38 Long after their 1993 sa-
le to Paracom, an Argentine company, both satellites were retired (on 5
May 2003 and 7 January 1998, respectively)39 – but no notification there-
of has ever made it to the UN register, in spite of the fact that Argentina
had notified the United Nations of the establishment of its national register
on 30 December 1996.40
Back to the other BSKyB satellite sold on-orbit: the Marcopolo-1. That
satellite, like its brother, had been launched on a Delta by McDonnell
Douglas from US territory (on 27 August 1989) and registered with the
United Nations by the UK authorities (on 12 April 1990).41 Again, the
United Kingdom also under its own interpretation was to be considered
a ‘launching State’. BskyB, however, sold this Marcopolo satellite to a
new operator from a country which already had a national register: NSAB
from Sweden. Sweden consequently notified the United Nations of inclu-
sion of the now renamed Sirius-1 in its national register on 1 February
1999.42 The satellite was then moved (in 2000) from one geostationary po-
sition to another (from 5.20 E to 130 W); which information was also for-
37 See ST/SG/SER/E/518.
38 See ST/SG/SER/E/156.
39 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anik_(satellite).
40 See ST/SG/SER.E/INF.13.
41 See ST/SG/SER.E/219.
42 See ST/SG/SER.E/352. Note that Sweden never formally notified the United Na-
tions of establishment of its national register, although as of 1986 (when its nation-
al register was actually established, as per Sec. 4, Decree on Space Activities,
1982: 1069; National Space Legislation of the World, Vol. I (2001), at 399; Space
Law – Basic Legal Documents, E.II.2; 36 Zeitschrift für Luft- und Weltraumrecht
(1987), 11) it had started to send notifications to the United Nations; cf. ST/SG/
SER.E/145.
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warded to the United Nations by Sweden.43 However, when the satellite
was ultimately removed to a graveyard orbit, it was again the United
Kingdom which so notified the United Nations on 15 June 2007.44
Our next example came from the Asia-Pacific region, where Koreasat-2
had been sold by KT Corporation, a South Korean company, to ABS,
which is based in Bermuda but seems to have fundamental ties with Hong
Kong as well. The satellite had originally been launched on 14 January
1996 on a Delta launch vehicle from the United States, and had been re-
gistered with the United Nations on 11 March 1996 by South Korea45 even
as, in view of KT Corporation’s private legal status, the status of South
Korea as ‘launching State’ was much more in doubt than that of the
United States. Also after its handover to ABS in 2009, however, KT conti-
nued to provide telemetry, tracking and control services for the satellite
and on 13 December 2013, South Korea provided additional information
on the satellite’s move from 113° E to 74.8° E and the transfer of its ow-
nership to ABS – four years after the fact.46
A similar situation arose with Koreasat-1B, sold one year after its sister
satellite by the same KT Corporation to the same ABS – except this time it
had been launched (on 5 September 1999) on an Ariane launcher from
French Guiana, making France the potential other State of registry instead
of the United States – and the more undisputed one compared to South
Korea. However, once again, South Korea registered the satellite with the
United Nations (on 18 September 1999),47 whilst KT Corporation conti-
nued to provide telemetry, tracking and control services for the satellite.
The last example of sale-in-orbit concerned the Spot-7, launched on be-
half of the French company Airbus Defence & Space on 30 June 2014, on
top of a PSLV launch vehicle by the Indian Space Research Organisation
(ISRO) from India. Soon after, it was handed over to Azercosmos, the na-
tional space agency of Azerbaijan – but in any event, whichever State
might have considered itself the appropriate ‘launching State’, it has not
been registered with the United Nations (yet).
The special scenario which developed in the cases of AsiaSat-1 and
AsiaSat-2, of transfer of nationality of the owner of a satellite concomitant
43 See ST/SG/SER.E/377.
44 See ST/SG/SER.E/518.
45 See ST/SG/SER.E/304.
46 See ST/SG/SER.E/304/Add.1.
47 See ST/SG/SER.E/362.
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to a transfer of sovereignty of the registration authority, was handled much
better, in spite of some strictly legal complications. Owned by AsiaSat, a
Hong Kong company, they were launched on 7 April 1990 and 28 Novem-
ber 1995, respectively, that is at a time when Hong Kong was still part of
the United Kingdom. Consequently, the United Kingdom had registered
both launches with the United Nations on 15 May 1990 respectively 23 Ja-
nuary 1996.48 When Hong Kong in 1997 reverted from the United King-
dom to China, it was almost a stroke of luck that both satellites had been
launched on Long March launch vehicles operated by the China Great
Wall Industrial Corporation, the Chinese governmental launch provider,
from China. Even though under the Registration Convention’s provisions
re-registration was not formally allowed, China’s status as original co-
launching state made it easier for China to notify the United Nations of the
relevant changes. China had as a matter of fact started notifying the United
Nations of launches conducted from China in 199049, but as it had esta-
blished a national register in 2001 and only notified that establishment to
the United Nations in 200550, it only informed the United Nations of the
transfer of ownership to China and of the removal of Asiasat-1 to a gra-
veyard orbit on 8 June 2005.
The other special scenario briefly discussed above, of transfer of ow-
nership of a company owning satellites, concerned amongst others the afo-
rementioned Telesat Canada, founded in 1989 and headquartered as a
company in Canada but as of 2007 becoming majority-owned by the US
Company Loral. Nevertheless, Canada until 2008 continued to notify the
United Nations of satellites launched on behalf of Telesat Canada, the last
one being the Nimiq-4.51 The next Telesat Canada satellite, Nimiq-5, was
not formally registered at all, but since being launched in 2009 by Russia,
was mentioned in a side-note in a Russian note verbale to the United Nati-
ons of 10 May 2010.52 The same applies to the Telstar-14R and Nimiq-6,
the only further satellites launched by Telesat since Loral’s take-over of
the company.53
48 See ST/SG/SER.E/222 resp. ST/SG/SER.E/300.
49 See ST/SG/SER.E/229.
50 See ST/SG/SER.E/INF.17.
51 See ST/SG/SER.E/597. More broadly: http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/osoindex/searc
h-ng.jspx?lf_id=, type in ‘Telesat Canada’ in ‘Search Object’ box.
52 See ST/SG/SER.E/593.
53 See ST/SG/SER.E/624 resp. ST/SG/SER.E/661.
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Another example of the same scenario pertained to LMI-1, launched in
1999 on a Proton vehicle from Baikonur in Kazakhstan for the LMI inter-
national consortium formed by a US private company and an intergovern-
mental organization dominated by Russia. Russia informed the United Na-
tions of this launch by way of another side-note in a Russian note verbale
of 10 December 1999, specifically adding that this concerned a “United
States telecommunications satellite”.54 Then, of course, LMI was acquired
by ABS in 2006 – but this information did not make it to the UN register.
Finally, there was Agila-2, launched in 1997 from China and registered
with the United Nations in 2003 by the Philippines55 since the owner of
the satellite, Mabuhay Satellite Corporation, was a Philippine entity –
even as it was a private corporation, its procurement of the launch was
perceived by the Philippines to qualify them as launching State, a prere-
quisite for serving as State of registry. The Corporation was itself acquired
in 2009 by ABS, the satellite renamed ABS-5 – but this information did
not make it to the UN register either.
Concluding Remarks
The above survey, not even complete in itself, already shows the compli-
cations in the legal realm that have resulted from the introduction of nor-
mal commercial private-law practices such as transfer of ownership (or in-
deed of leasing of spacecraft and/or transponders in orbit) into the space
arena by way of transfer of ownership in orbit, where (public, internatio-
nal) space law has largely remained unchanged since the early days.
The system of registration of space objects was established in the 1960s
and 1970s with the aim to create as much transparency as possible on the
whereabouts of operational (and non-operational) space objects and on
which State would be responsible and liable for activities conducted there-
with and damage caused thereby. It may have been suffering from legal
and practical flaws from the start,56 but it is now receiving a different kind
of blow from those transfers of ownership of various kinds, which increa-
singly raises problems in practice of actual governmental oversight.
5.
54 ST/SG/SER.E/367.
55 See A/AC.105/INF.409.
56 Cf. e.g. Y. Lee, Registration of Space Objects: ESA Member States’ Practice, 22
Space Policy (2006), 42–51.
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Satellites remain unregistered or key information on their operation or
ownership goes unnoticed (at least at the UN level), very likely at least in
part because of confusion or tactical ignorance, made possible thereby, of
who should take the lead in this respect. Which State, indeed, is responsi-
ble for a satellite’s operations: the one (of nationality of the entity) owning
it or the one (of nationality of the entity) tracking and controlling it opera-
tionally? Which State(s), originally involved as launching State(s), con-
sider themselves still liable after the ownership has moved to (the entity
from) a third country? Who should register in these complex scenarios,
where formally re-registration is anyway not envisaged by the Registration
Convention, and who should exercise jurisdiction? And over what part of
a spacecraft, noting the further problems thrown into the mix in this con-
text by the Space Assets Protocol?
The most positive thing that can be said as of today, is that no serious
consequences have resulted – at least as far as can be seen from the outs-
ide. Yet, it could only be presumed that the practices discussed above will
continue to become more extended, varied and complicated as both the
number of State players in outer space and the number and range of non-
state players continues to increase. With the huge investments at stake in a
commercial context, not to mention the public interests in maintaining a
sustainable space environment for all States of the world and free and be-
neficial exploration and use of outer space in deference to the Outer Space
Treaty, major accidents are only waiting to happen: it would be a mistake
to not start thinking seriously now about how to address these issues.
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